Access to Work Product of Disqualified Counsel
An increasingly important aspect of litigation is the possibility
that one party may seek the disqualification of the opposing party's
counsel. Disqualification of an attorney for ethical violations may
serve a number of functions: it may serve to punish misbehavior, to
preserve confidences threatened by conflicting representation, or to
maintain the appearance of propriety of the profession.' After years
of grappling with the problems of enforcing ethics in an adversary
system, the courts have only recently begun to achieve a sensible
accommodation between the competing interests in the disqualifi2
cation controversy.
Still unresolved, however, is the problem of the aftermath of
disqualification: specifically, what portion of the legal work done by
a disqualified attorney may be passed on by the client to substitute
counsel. The solution to this problem is crucial to an equitable
restoration of the adversarial balance disrupted by disqualification
of one party's counsel. By denying access to work product of disqualified counsel, the court may impose on a party the onerous burden
of beginning his case anew and on the system the waste of judicial
resources involved in repeating the possibly prolonged process of
No other profession seems so collectively conscious of its public image, to so little
apparent avail, as the bar. Recent literature on the subject includes G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN
THE PRACTCE OF LAW (1978); Morgan, The Evolving Concept of ProfessionalResponsibility,
90 HARv. L. REV. 702, 702 (1977) (noting an "increasing attack" on the Code of Professional
Responsibility as "irrelevant, internally inconsistent, and conspiratoiial"); Symposium,
Ethical Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers, 33 Bus. LAw. 1173 (1977). See also Joiner,
Teaching ProfessionalResponsibility, 64 A.B.A.J. 551 (1978).
2 See Note, The Second Circuit and Attorney Disqualification-SilverChrysler Steers
in a New Direction, 44 FoRDimi L. REv. 130 (1975). See generally Liebman, The Changing
Law of Disqualification:The Role of Presumptionand Policy, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 996 (1979).
The courts have in general been receptive to challenges based on breach of professional ethics
because of their responsibility for upholding the integrity of the judicial process. See, e.g.,
First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc);
IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (2d Cir. 1978); Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d
706 (7th Cir. 1976); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1975).
Increasingly, however, courts have expressed a troubled awareness of the use of such challenges for their harassment value alone. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246
(2d Cir. 1979); Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988 (8th
Cir. 1978); Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976); International
Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1289, 1293-95 (2d Cir. 1975). Courts have also expressed the view that they should not be turned into disciplinary forums. Board of Educ. v.
Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1248 (2d Cir. 1979) (Mansfield, J., concurring); W.T. Grant Co. v.
Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976); Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1141
(2d Cir. 1975); Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1975).
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discovery and other pretrial matters. Yet, in some cases access to
disqualified counsel's work product would negate the remedial effect of disqualification. The decision whether to allow access must
focus upon whether denial will promote the policy served by a particular disqualification order. This comment examines the justification for denial of access to work product in light of the policies
underlying disqualification of counsel and evaluates the reasoning
applied by the few courts that have faced the issue.3 The comment
then analyzes the situations in which disqualification commonly
occurs 4 and suggests a method for determining when access to work
product should be permitted.
I. THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT
A.

The Scope of Work Product Affected by Disqualification

The process of litigation is largely conducted through the medium of written documents. The parties submit to the court a vast
array of written material: pleadings, interrogatories and answers,
depositions, affidavits, motions, trial transcripts, memoranda, and
briefs. Perhaps even greater in quantity are the supporting materials that the parties accumulate for their own use in preparation for
trial, including primary documents, factual summaries, notes of
conversations or interviews, and legal analyses of both substantive
and procedural issues. When a party's counsel is disqualified, the
issue of substitute counsel's access to the work product 5 generated
First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc),
is the first reported case involving an in-depth examinaton of the work product access question. Other cases in which the courts allowed access to the work product without extended
discussion include: IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1978); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977); W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671 (2d
Cir. 1976); Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1975); Allied Realty
of St. Paul, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823
(1969); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969). The most thorough
opinions to date denying access to work product are First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis.
Corp., 571 F.2d 390, vacated, 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc), and Edilcentro Int'l,
Ltd. v. Porco, No. 75-6488 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1978).
' The focus will be on those canons most often involved in disqualification proceedings,
specifically: Canon 4 ("A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client"),
Canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a
Client"), and Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Impropriety").
Breaches of the other canons may well merit discipline, but will only rarely appear in the
context of disqualification. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979).
See, e.g., W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976) (direct contact with opposing party); Fisher Studio, Inc. v. Loews, Inc., 232 F.2d 199, 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 836 (1956) (solicitation).
I The term "work product" as used in this comment embraces all these possible categories of material. The term is used more broadly than in the discovery context, where the
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by the disqualified attorney may form the basis of a continuing
controversy. The most important situation raising the work-product
issue is that in which the attorney is disqualified because of prior
representation of an opposing party in a matter substantially related to the current lawsuit.6 In such a case, the attorney is disqualified because of the danger that confidences and secrets gained during the prior representation might be used in the current lawsuit.
There is also the danger that the work product of the attorney might
be "tainted"-that it might contain or reflect confidential information. Different categories of work product are more or less likely to
be tainted. Legal research and analysis on procedural aspects of the
litigation or work product concerning substantive areas not related
to the prior representation, for example, would seem to pose little
danger. 7 Seemingly routine legal work may, however, be found to
have benefitted from the breach of confidence. Initial pleadings
almost always appear unobjectionable; yet there have been cases in
which the pleadings themselves were inspired by illicitly obtained
information.' In such cases, the pleadings must be struck and the
files sealed.
B.

The Procedural Posture

Once an attorney has been disqualified, either party may raise
the issue of access to the disqualified attorney's work product. The
party who successfully sought disqualification might seek a court
order denying work-product access to his opponent's substitute
counsel, either as a part of the motion for disqualificaton or after
disqualification has been granted. The client of the disqualified
"work-product privilege" prevents the disclosure to the adverse party of some types of an
attorney's trial preparation materials. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947);
26.63-.64 (2d ed. 1976). In the
Frn. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); 4 MooRE's FDmAL PRCAcE
disqualification context, a litigant seeks to pass the work product of his own attorney, now
disqualified, to the substitute counsel. The adverse party may object to this transfer, but does
not seek access for his own use. Cf. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d
201, 211 n.5 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (plaintiff offered to drop objection to transfer of work
product on condition that plaintiff also be allowed access to the materials).
' See text and notes at notes 61-62 infra.
7 But see Edilcentro Int'l, Ltd. v. Porco, No. 75-6488, slip op. at 5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12,
1978). Similarly, work performed before the cause for disqualification arose is likely to be
untainted.
E.g., Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam sub norn.
Hall v. A. Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972); Slater v. Rimar, 462 Pa. 138, 338 A.2d 584
(1975). But see Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen, 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).

' Cases in which injunctive relief was requested in addition to the disqualification include Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen, 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977) and W.T. Grant
Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976).
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attorney might raise the issue through substitute counsel, by moving for an amendment of the disqualification order' ° or by filing a
motion for authorization to use the work product." Substitute counsel's motivation for raising the issue himself is to avoid the possibility that he might subsequently be disqualified as a result of having
used tainted materials." In particular, where disqualification results from a claim of counsel's access to confidential information or
use of information obtained in the course of prior representation,
substitute counsel follows a safer course by awaiting court approval
before touching the possibly tainted files.
When a client's request that substitute counsel be allowed
access to the disqualified attorney's work product is denied by a
federal district court, the client is not without recourse. If an order
regarding access is made as a part of the disqualification decision
3
itself, it should be appealable along with the disqualification order.'
Whether a separate order denying work-product access is appealable is a more difficult question. The Seventh Circuit, in First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp.,'4 recently held an
order denying access to the work product of the predecessor attorney
to be appealable, despite its apparent lack of finality. 5 Although the
court found that the appeal from an order denying access fell within
the "collateral order exception" to the finality rule,' 6 it is not clear
0 Such a motion would be pursuant to rules 52(b) and 59(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. This procedure, as one court has noted, "might be the proper method to
raise the issue of work product access after attorney disqualification in future cases." First
Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, 395 (7th Cir.), vacated, 584 F.2d 201
(7th Cir. 1978) (en banc). The approach may often be impracticable, however, because such
motions must be made within ten days of the disqualification order. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(b),
59(e). Some litigants might have difficulty procuring satisfactory substitute counsel so
quickly.
11This procedure was used in First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d
201, 203 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
12 See, e.g., P & M Elec. Co. v. Godard, 478 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. 1972), in which substitute
counsel retained to defend against disqualification of the original attorney subsequently faced
a motion for disqualification based on a claim that he had been exposed to confidential
information through the first attorney's work product.
13In IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1978) and W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d
671 (2d Cir. 1976), the court of appeals ruled on the propriety of district court orders permitting access to work product in the course of appeals from the disqualification orders. The
case for appellate review of an order denying access would seem even stronger, because the
appeal would be filed by the same party protesting the disqualification.
14 584 F.2d 201, 203 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (adopting as the opinion of the en banc
court part II of the panel opinion, 571 F.2d at 392-96).
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) ("The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.") (emphasis added).
11571 F.2d at 392-96. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
The Seventh Circuit identified four elements of the collateral order exception: (1) the order
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that other courts will reach the same conclusion.17 Orders granting
access, on the other hand, should never be appealable under the
collateral order exception because the error, if serious, could be
remedied upon appeal from final judgment."
C.

The Cost of Reproducing Lost Work Product
When an attorney is disqualified, his client incurs certain costs,

whether or not the client abetted or even knew of his attorney's
ethical infraction. The client is deprived of the counsel of his choice,

and the legal action is delayed while substitute counsel is located
and that counsel prepares for litigation.19 When the court denies
substitute counsel access to the work product of his predecessor, the
client may suffer a more tangible loss, for he is denied the use of
legal work for which he may have paid, or might still be billed.
Although the Seventh Circuit has assumed that the client will
bear the cost of denial of access to work product, 0 a number of state
courts have held that the loss should be borne by the disqualified
2
attorney. The California Court of Appeals, in Goldstein v. Lees, '
admitted an attorney's ethical infraction as a defense against his
subsequent suit for fees. The clients had retained the services of a
law firm in connection with a proxy fight to gain control of a corpomust present an "important and unsettled question of law," (2) it must not be susceptible of
effective review on appeal from final judgment, (3) it must be independent of the main
cause of action, and (4) the danger of denying review must outweigh the inconveniences and
cost of piecemeal review. 571 F.2d at 393. It is debatable whether the work-product decision
involves an important and unsettled issue of law. As the First Wisconsin case itself illustrates, the factual variations make general legal principles difficult to apply. It might also
be argued that the injury to the party denied access, although irreparable, is no more serious
than many costly discovery orders.
1' The court noted that "once the disqualification decision has been made, the factual
differences surrounding the issue of access to work product are few." 571 F.2d at 394. At least
in the Seventh Circuit, the question of access might not be regarded as important and
unsettled in subsequent cases.
" Cf. Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualificationof
Counsel in the FederalCourts,45 U. Cm. L. Rav. 450 (1978) (arguing that orders disqualifying
attorneys should be appealable, but that orders denying disqualification should not be).
" See, e.g., Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978).
See also W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976).
2 First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 205, 209 (7th Cir. 1978)
(en banc); accord, Edilcentro Int'l, Ltd. v. Porco, No. 75-6488, slip op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
30, 1977); Note, Attorney Disqualificationand Access to Work Product, 63 CoRaLL L. RzV.
1054, 1072 & n.79 (1978). The dissent in First Wisconsin did not share the majority's tacit
assumption that a denial of access would necessarily place the full economic loss on the
disqualified attorney's client, 584 F.2d at 220, although Judge Castle noted that the "relative
culpability" of the attorneys and their former client was not the main object of concern. Id.
at 219 n.13 (dissenting opinion).
21 46 Cal. App. 3d 614, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975).
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ration to which the firm had formerly been general counsel. Although only the corporation could have been injured by the ethical
violation, the court nevertheless absolved the clients from liability
for fees, saying that "such representation is improper and

. . .

a

contract
to provide such services is void for reasons of public pol22
icy."

Subsequent decisions have extended the rationale of

Goldstein to cases involving adverse representations in unrelated
matters.?
Rather than requiring that either the client or the disqualified
attorney exclusively bear the cost of disqualification, the most likely
outcome is that the client and the disqualified attorney will each
24
bear a portion of the cost.

The incidence of the loss resulting from the denial of access to
work product necessarily has a bearing on the decision whether to
- Id. at 617, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 254. The court relied on earlier state supreme court
precedent. Anderson v. Eaton, 211 Cal. 113, 116, 293 P. 788, 789 (1930); Clark v. Millsap,
197 Cal. 765, 785, 242 P. 918, 926 (1926). The California Rules of Professional Conduct are
more explicit than the comparable provisions of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.
California Rule 4-101 states:
A member of the State Bar shall not accept employment adverse to a client or a former
client, without the informed and written consent of the client and former client, relating
to a matter in reference to which he has obtained confidential information by reason of
or in the course of his employment by such client or former client.
The court in Goldstein recognized that its ruling resulted in a "windfall" to the clients, but
nevertheless insisted that "'[c]ourts do not sit to give effect to . . . illegal contracts.'" 46
Cal. App. 3d at 624, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 258 (footnote omitted) (quoting Valentine v. Steward,
15 Cal. 387, 405 (1860)).
23In re Hansen, 586 P.3d 413, 417 (Utah 1978) (requiring attorney to return fees already
paid by client); Jeffry v. Pounds, 67 Cal. App. 3d 6, 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. 373, 375 (1977) (denying
disqualified attorney unpaid fees because "acts of impropriety inconsistent with the character
of the legal profession and incompatible with the faithful discharge of professional duties will
prevent an attorney from recovering for his services"). In Jeffry, the court rejected the trial
court's conclusion that since there was no danger of prejudice from disclosure, the attorney
should be able to recover his fee. The court of appeals concluded that this unduly narrowed
the scope of the rule. The court emphasized that its holding was not dependent on a finding
of deliberate unethical conduct. Id.
24 The allocation of the loss between client and attorney will depend on a variety of
factors: any prior agreement between attorney and client, the nature of their continuing
relationship, the culpability of the attorney, the client's advance knowledge of the risks
involved in continuing the representation and possible acceptance of that risk as part of the
price for the attorney's representation, and the portion of the client's bill paid or left unpaid
at the time of disqualification.
Partners of major law firms responding informally to our inquiries emphasized the importance of the client's full knowledge of the possible disqualification to the allocation of the
financial loss. Where the client is fully informed, he is thought to have assumed the risk of
disqualification.
The importance of the ,status of payments on the client's bill is procedural: if the client
has already paid, he must sue in order to recover his payments; if he has not paid, the
procedural burden is on the attorney.
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permit such access. While the courts might be willing to impose this
additional penalty upon an errant attorney-at least in the case of
a clear or avoidable breach of ethical duty5--courts may be expected to be more reluctant to impose further costs upon the client.
The Seventh Circuit, for example, has expressed concern that denial
of access to the work product "is a real penalty for the client," and
that it is an undesirable one when imposed "irrespective of any fault
on the part of the party litigant. 2 Since in most instances the loss
will be divided between client and attorney, courts should decide
the work-product access question so as not to harm an innocent
client any more than is necessary to serve the purposes of the ABA
Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.
I.

THE POLICIES OF DISQUALIFICATION AND THEIR BEARING

ON WORK-

PRODUCT ACCESS

The ABA Code of ProfessionalResponsibility2 seeks to promote
public trust in the bench and bar, as well as to protect clients and
litigants from injury arising from specific ethical violations. A court
may impose disqualification either as a sanction against an attorney
who has violated the Code, in order to deter unethical behavior and
maintain public confidence in the bar, or as a remedy for the party
who has been disadvantaged by the attorney's violation. When an
attorney has breached the confidences of a client, for example, disqualification may serve both as a sanction and as a remedy. Even
in the absence of injury to a particular litigant, however, sanctions
including disqualification may be imposed on attorneys whose conduct could tarnish the reputation of the profession.2s Whether sub21 Where the lawyer's breach was not deliberate, and he took reasonable precautions to
avoid the ethical problem, increasing the penalty by denying his successor access to his work
product would serve no purpose. So long as disqualification may be granted for mere
"appearances of impropriety," there will be disqualified attorneys whose conduct was basically innocent.
26First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 205 (7th Cir. 1978) (en

banc).
17 Some states may have rules that differ in some respects, e.g., rules promulgated under
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (West 1974). This comment focuses for the most part on
federal appellate decisions based on the ABA Code. Where state decisions differ or better
illustrate the problems involved in the inquiry, they will be noted. State decisions are collected in Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 389 (1969); Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 835 (1968); Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d
1243 (1957).
2s The court's power to disqualify attorneys may derive from the attorney's position as
an officer of the court, Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364, 374 (1869), or it may be
incidental to the power to admit to practice, Rowen v. LeMans Mut. Ins. Co., 230 N.W.2d
905, 913-14 (Iowa 1975). See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EvALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DisCIPNARY ENFORCEMENT 10-18 (1970).
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stitute counsel should be denied access to work product of disqualified counsel depends on the extent to which such denial is required
to further the particular policy served by the disqualification order.
A.

Disqualification as a Sanction

The use of disqualification as a sanction is often found in situations in which Canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent
Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client") is applicable."9 The
main purpose of this canon is to guarantee the undivided loyalty of
the attorney to his client. Specific disciplinary rules cover such
conflicts as adverse financial or personal interests, 0 the prospect
that the lawyer or his associate would be called as a witness, 3' the
acquisition of a proprietary interest in the litigation, ' and the transaction of outside business with a client. 33 Most significant are the
provisions of Disciplinary Rule 5-105, which concern the lawyer's
representation of the interests of multiple clients. A lawyer must
decline multiple employment that might impair the exercise of his
independent professional judgment or involve him in representing
differing interests unless it is obvious that he can adequately represent each client and the clients agree to the multiple representation
after disclosure of the possible effects on the attorney's independent
judgmentY4
The scope and purpose of Disciplinary Rule 5-105 were considered in IBM v. Levin. 35 IBM moved for disqualification of plaintiff's counsel on a theory of concurrent representation. Prior to and
during the pendency of plaintiff's antitrust suit against IBM, an
attorney in IBM's legal department had contacted a member of
plaintiff's firm regarding a series of discrete and unrelated labor
problems. On the basis of this representation, IBM moved for disqualification in the antitrust suit. The motion was granted by the
district court and affirmed by the Second Circuit.
The court of appeals acknowledged that IBM was not injured
in its capacity as a litigant in the antitrust suit, 3 and indeed that
"ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILY, Canon 5 (1975).
DR 5-101(a).
DR 5-101(B), 5-102. See International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 129095 (2d Cir. 1975).
32ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-103 (1975).
-Id., DR 5-104.
Id., DR 5-105.
- 579 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1978).
"Id. at 283.
3Id.,
31 Id.,
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any possiblity of injury was eliminated by IBM's dismissal of the
firm in the labor matters. 37 Although a Canon 5 violation of this sort
may cause injury to the client,'s IBM's disqualification motion appears incongruous since the infraction in this case would have
tended to injure Levin, the plaintiff, not IBM.3 9 But, the court
noted, "[tihe plaintiff's interest in retaining counsel of its choice
and the lack of prejudice to IBM resulting from [the attorney's]
violation of professional ethics are not the only factors to be considered in this disqualification proceeding."40 Also to be considered is
the "maintenance of the integrity of the legal profession and its high
standing in the community."4 The public's sense of fair play is
surely offended by an attorney who purports to serve both sides in
a conflict. Disqualification, therefore, "is primarily justified as a
vindication of the integrity of the bar."4 2
The concept of disqualification as a sanction against unseemly,
even if harmless, behavior reaches fullest expression in cases involving Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of
Professional Impropriety.")."' This canon has been invoked to compel disqualification for the appearance of a violation of the other
canons, on the theory that conduct, even though ethical, may appear unethical to the public." As in the case of Canon 5 disqualifica17Id. at 282-83. Plaintiffs argued that IBM was not injured by the simultaneous representation because of the termination of that representation and the trial court finding that the
firm did not obtain any information which could be used against IBM in the antitrust suit.
The court did not dispute this, but predicated the disqualification on the need to promote
public confidence in the bar.
3 The firm might not pursue the litigation as vigorously as possible for fear of offending
a client in other matters. Id. at 280. See also Cinerama 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d
1384 (2d Cir. 1976), cited in IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d at 280.
3' IBM might be considered injured in its labor law matters, but disqualification of the
plaintiffs firm in the antitrust suit does not remedy this injury. Either IBM could discharge
the firm-which it did-or it could retain the firm. In the latter instance, it is unlikely that
procuring the firm's disqualification in another matter would serve to restore the firm's
undivided loyalty.
11579 F.2d at 283.
"Id.
In a situation in which one party is harmed and the other party is left no better
42 Id.
off by a court action, it might be questioned whether the public would agree that the
"integrity of the bar" should be "vindicated" at the expense of the litigants. See Woods v.
Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 812-13 (5th Cir. 1976).
13 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBTY, Canon 9 (1975).
" See Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1090-91 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 830 (1976); W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 302 F.2d 268, 269 (2d Cir. 1962) (per
curiam); Note, Ethical Considerations When an Attorney Opposes a Former Client: The
Need for a Realistic Application of Canon 9, 52 Cm.-KaNT L. REv. 525 (1975). See also ABA
COMM. ON PROFSSIONAL ETmcs, INORMAL OPnION No. 885 (1965) ("the lawyer should avoid
representation of a party in a suit against a former client, where there mdy be the appear-
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tion, the policy served is not protection of the attorney's adversaries
in subsequent litigation, but preservation of the integrity of the
profession from the appearance that the interests of a party are
being compromised or that the judicial process itself is tainted in
any way.
In the absence of a possibility of prejudice to the disqualified
attorney's present or former client arisingfrom his ethical violation,
a disqualification order may serve three purposes: deterrence of future ethical violations by the attorney and other members of the
bar, protection of the court itself from ethical taint, and maintenance of the profession's public image. Whether disqualification
should be complemented by an order denying substitute counsel
access to his predecessor's work product depends on whether such
an order will advance these purposes.
1. Deterrence.To the extent that the economic burden of the
denial of access to work product is borne by the errant attorney, 5
such an order will increase the penalty for ethical infractions." To
that extent, therefore, such an order may be justified. The additional deterrence, however, is created at the cost of punishing the
attorney's client as well. Assuming that the client was not at fault
in the lawyer's breach of professional ethics, this punishment is
unfair. Moreoever, the additional deterrent effect of this added penalty is not likely to outweigh the added hardship it imposes on the
client. The stigma of disqualification alone probably suffices to
ance of a conflict of interest or a possible violation of confidence, even though this may not
be true in fact"). But see Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir.
1976); International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975); Redd v. Shell
Oil Co., [1974-2] Trade Cas. 75,392 at 98,278 (D. Utah), rev'd on other grounds, 518 F.2d
311 (10th Cir. 1975); Comment, supra note 18, at 459.
Disqualification may also result from a violation of Disciplinary Rule 9-101, which prohibits a former government attorney from subsequently accepting private employment in
regard to a matter for which he had "substantial responsibility" while in government service.
ABA CODE OF PROFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILrrY, DR 9-101. The policy behind the rule is not
protection of the party's adversaries, but preservation of the integrity of the profession from
the appearance that government service is being manipulated for private gain. See Central
Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 990 (8th Cir. 1978) (dictum);
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 (2d Cir. 1974). But cf. Allied
Realty v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 283 F. Supp. 464, 466 (D. Minn. 1968), affl'd, 408 F.2d 1099
(8th Cir. 1969) (suggesting the need to protect the opposite party from this misuse of information gained during government employment). Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d
804 (5th Cir. 1976), contains a discussion of both these rationales for the rule. Id. at 814-18.
" See text and notes at notes 19-26 supra.
But see First Wisconsin, 584 F.2d at 209. The court said that denial of access to work
product "would in no way discipline disqualified counsel whose actions have been the cause
of the disqualification order." The court assumed that the client would bear the full cost. Id.
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deter most avoidable breaches:4 7 as in the criminal law, the speed
and certainty of punishment tend to provide more effective deterrence than an increase in penalties."8
A further consideration is the propriety of the courts judging
disqualification orders primarily with a view to deterrence. The Second Circuit has noted that "[t]he business of the courts is to dispose of litigation and not to act as general overseer of the ethics of
those who practice here unless the questioned behavior taints the
trial of the cause before it."49 The principal instrument for the enforcement of professional ethics must be the grievance committees
of the bar.5"
2. Protectionof the Court. Attorneys serve as officers of the
court; their behavior reflects upon the court and can materially
affect the quality of justice meted out. Consequently, even in the
absence of particular injury to litigants, courts have an interest in
removing from their positions as officers those attorneys whose conduct they consider ethically censurable. It might also be argued that
the court has an interest in expunging from its records and processes
the tainted work product of the wayward lawyer. On this ground, it
might be necessary to deny access to the disqualified attorney's
11Part of the deterrence may stem from the disappointed client. Professor Hazard has
suggested that
[t]he clients [of] large corporate firms are relatively sophisticated about conflicts and
reasonably tolerant of wholly unforeseeable ones. But they are also in a position to wreak
heavy retribution if their affairs become involved in a conflict they think should have
been avoided. . . .Word of the client's dissatisfaction can spread through the corporate
grapevine, resulting in permanent damage to the firm's reputation and the reputation
of its members and associates.
G.

HAZARD,

supra note 1, at 82.

" See Andenaes, The GeneralPreventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949,
961-62 (1960).
1' W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1975); accord, Board of Educ. v.
Nyquist, 591 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136,
1141 (2d Cir. 1975). Even Judge Castle, who dissented from a decision granting access to work
product, agreed that deterrence is not the purpose of the order: "[T]he purpose of denying
access to the work is not to penalize the defendants but, more importantly, to protect the
plaintiffs specifically and the public generally." 584 F.2d at 221 n.16 (Castle, J., dissenting
in part, concurring in part).
10Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 591 F.2d 1241, 1246-48 (2d Cir. 1979); Lefrak v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1975); Van Graafeiland, Lawyers' Conflict of
Interest-A Judge's View, pt. I, 178 N.Y.L.J. 13, 22, col. 2 (July 20, 1977). In his most recent
State of the Judiciary address to the American Bar Association, Chief Justice Burger commented on the methods by which professional misconduct may be punished, listing as appropriate sanctions "reprimand, censure, suspension or disbarment." Annual Address to the
American Bar Association on the State of the Judiciary 4 (Feb. 11, 1979). Although the Chief
Justice noted that both courts and bar associations have a role to play, his emphasis was on
discipline; disqualification proceedings were not mentioned in this respect.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[46:443

work product. Where the ethical breach gave disqualified counsel no
prejudicial advantage over his opponent in the litigation, however,
his work product will be no better or worse-or more tainted-than
the work product of any other attorney of comparable talent in his
position. Moreover, if substitute counsel, by investing time and resources, can duplicate the work, the challenged work product cannot be said to be tainted. If the work itself is untainted, then the
moving party's only benefit from procuring the order denying access
will be the increase in cost and inconvenience to his opponent-a
benefit that need not be conferred in order to protect the integrity
and quality of the judicial system.
3. Appearancesof Propriety.Since one purpose of a disqualification order is to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the
profession, it might be argued that denial of access to the errant
attorney's work product is also needed. An unsophisticated public
might not distinguish between tainted and untainted work product
and might consider the continued use of either as an injustice. Although no one knows with certainty what reaction the public may
have to the occurrences in the courtroom, 51 as the prejudice to individual litigants disappears it may be expected -that the public's
interest correspondingly wanes. The public's concern is, after all,
that the litigants receive fair treatment. In the absence of evidence
of prejudice, it seems unlikely that the public will inquire any
deeper. On the contrary, it seems more likely that, as the Fifth
Circuit has commented, "the more frequently a litigant is delayed
or otherwise disadvantaged by the unnecessary disqualification of
his lawyer . . . , the greater the likelihood of public suspicion of
both the bar and the judiciary. 5 2 Where the client of the disqualified attorney is subjected to further delay and expense without any
redeeming protection of the opposing party's rights, public esteem
is more likely to decrease than increase.
Denial of access to untainted work product does not, therefore,
substantially further any of the purposes of the disqualification policy, although it does inflict substantial "punishment" on the client
of the disqualified attorney. In such instances, access to the work
product should not be denied. The results reached by the few courts
confronted with this question, though short on analysis, are consistent with this conclusion. 3 For example, the court in International
"But see First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d at 220 (Castle, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part) (Judge Castle was willing to speculate that the average
person would "not approve of allowing disqualified counsel's work to be used against its
former client on the facts of this case.").
52 Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976).
11 See cases cited in note 3 supra.
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Business Machines Corp. v. Levin54 rejected IBM's argument that
the plaintiff should be denied access, saying, "the district court
ameliorated the harsh effect upon the plaintiffs of its sanction
against [their counsel] by permitting the turnover to substitute
''
counsel . . . of the past work product."55
B.

Disqualification as a Remedy

Although disqualification under Canons 5 and 9 does not appear necessarily to require denial of access to work product, not all
cases of disqualification are free of danger of prejudice to the moving
party. Indeed, under the most common ground for disqualification,
Canon 4 ("A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets
of a Client"), 5 the moving party faces the prospect that the confid- 579 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1978).
55Id. at 283. In arguing for denial of access, IBM had relied on the panel decision in First
Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, vacated, 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978)
(en banc). The Second Circuit court noted:
To the extent that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals lays down a legal tenet in First
Wisconsin Mortgage Trust against permitting the turnover of a disqualified attorney's
work product, we disagree, but we note that the court in that case expressly limited its
holding to the facts of that case.
579 F.2d at 283 (citation omitted). The two decisions were not incompatible. Judge Castle's
opinion for the majority in the panel decision in First Wisconsin analyzed the case in terms
of possible prejudice to the moving party through disclosure of confidential information by
their former counsel. The IBM court, considering a situation in which disqualification was
justified as a sanction rather than as a remedy, would have been quite correct in finding the
first decision in First Wisconsin inapplicable in a Canon 5 case. The en banc majority in First
Wisconsin was able to characterize the facts as not posing the problem of confidentiality, and
in part relying on the IBM decision, 584 F.2d at 207-08, reached a decision contrary to that
of the panel and allowed access.
"ABA CODE OF PROFSSIONA REspONsmiarry, Canon 4 (1975). Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A)
defines "confidence" as "information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law," and "secret" as "other information gained in the professional relationship that the
client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or
would be likely to be detrimental to the client." Ethical Consideration 4-4 emphasizes that
the ethical obligation of the lawyer is broader than the attorney-client privilege and exists
"without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the
knowledge."
Neither the Code of Professional Responsibility nor the cases interpreting it make any
significant distinction between the concepts of "confidence" and "secret." This comment
therefore employs the terms interchangeably. The argument of one commentator, that analysis of the work-product problem requires separate consideration of "secrets" and
"confidences," Note, supra note 20, at 1058-59, 1063, should be rejected. This argument
would permit the conclusion that information imparted to a lawyer during the course of legal
representation is not protected by Canon 4 if it technically falls outside the attorney-client
privilege (thereby being disqualified as a "confidence") but was nevertheless directly transferred by the client (thereby falling outside the Note's concept of a "secret" as having been
obtained "from sources other than the client," id. at 1058 & n.25). This conclusion is directly

The University of Chicago Law Review

[46:443

ences he entrusted to a former attorney may be used against him
by an opposing party. Canon 4 disqualifications share with those
already discussed' the purposes of deterring unethical behavior,
protecting the courts from tainted proceedings, and maintaining
public confidence in the bar. In addition, however, Canon 4 disqualifications serve to protect the former client from the effects of his
erstwhile lawyer's ethical breach. Courts have generally recognized
that, over and above any desire to "vindicate the integrity of the
bar," the principal purpose of disqualification in these cases is to
serve as a remedy for the breach of the confidential relationship."
A guarantee that information passed to an attorney will remain
confidential is vital to the attorney-client relationship.5 9 A client
must be willing to supply to his attorney all information conceivably
related to his case, lest the adversary system operate on less than
the fullest complement of available information. To protect this
confidence even after the attorney-client relationship has ended,
the provisions of Canon 4 must be strictly enforced, so that a client
attorney in one
need not fear "that confidences conveyed to his
60
action will return to haunt him in a later one.
This concern with specific injury to the former client is reflected
in the test most commonly invoked for disqualification under Canon
4: the "substantial relationship" test.6' If the attorney's former
client can show that the present litigation involves matters
contrary to the quoted intention of Ethical Consideration 4-4 that the ethical obligation be
broader than the attorney-client privilege, and also contrary to the consistent practice of the
courts. See, e.g., NCK Organization Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1976).
7 See text and notes at notes 45-55 supra.
s'See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979). Some courts
have suggested that such breaches are the only appropriate ground for disqualification. Fred
Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905
(1978); Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharamaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1975) (characterizing disqualification as a "remedy"). In some instances disqualification is appropriate as a
remedy even though there is no danger of breach of confidence. Kroungold v. Triester, 521
F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1975) (disqualification denied on the basis of DR 5-101(B)). See also E.F.
Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 376-77 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (suggesting that only a
former client can bring a disqualification motion).
11 Canon 4's Ethical Consideration 4-1 provides: "The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates
the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance." See also Liebman, supra note 2 at 999.
60 Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1384 (3d Cir. 1972).
" E.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 223-25 (7th Cir. 1978);
American Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982, 984-85 (3d Cir. 1975); Emle Indus., Inc. v.
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973). This test was first applied by a federal district
court in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
See Liebman, supra note 2, at 1001-04; Note, Attorney's Conflict of Inteests: Representation
of Interest Adverse to That of Former Client, 55 B.U.L. REv. 61, 73-75 (1975).

1979]

Work Product of Disqualified Counsel

"substantially related" to the subject matter of a prior representation, the courts will presume the passing of confidential information,12 and disqualification will ensue. It is thought that by removing
the attorney from the case he will not be able to use the confidential
information-either consciously or unconsciously-against the former client. Disqualification alone may not adequately protect the
former client, however, if the attorney has used information acquired during the former representation in preparing the case. After
disqualification, substitute counsel might benefit from the disqualified attorney's special insight and inside information as reflected in
his work product and the former client would still be haunted by
his revealed confidences. Disqualification must therefore be accompanied by a denial of access to the tainted work product and substitute counsel must make a fresh beginning.
The need to deny substitute counsel access to work product
may be seen most starkly in cases such as Doe v. A Corp.,63 where
knowledge of the existence of a cause of action itself depended upon
illicit information supplied by a former attorney. In that case, the
full record, including the pleadings, was sealed in order'to protect
the former client."4 In the more common Canon 4 case, such as
EdilcentroInternational,Ltd. v. Porco,15 there is no dispute over the
"1 The attorney may not avoid disqualification by claiming that he did not have access

to confidential information or that no secrets were divulged to him. Were the rule otherwise,
it "would require the disclosure of the very matters intended to be protected" in order for
the movant to procure disqualification. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); accord, Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d
706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1975).

Knowledge obtained through a prior representation will also be imputed to partners and
associates in the firm. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311,
1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224
F.2d 824, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 982 (1956); Township Bd. v. Lewis,
234 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn. 1975). This "risk twice removed" has been criticized by some
commentators, e.g., Liebman, supra note 2, at 1000-01; Note, UnchangingRules in Changing
Times, 73 Yale L.J. 1058 (1964). The Second Circuit has apparently recognized the difficulties
the strict rule has created for large-firm practice; accordingly, the court has now made this
presumptive imputation rebuttable. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor
Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754-57 (2d Cir. 1975); Note, supra note 2, at 145-48.
3 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Hall v. A. Corp., 453

F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972). Doe concerned an attorney who was discharged from a law firm
which was counsel to "A" Corp. Before the discharge, he purchased one share of the defendant's stock, so that he could later file a stockholder's derivative suit on the basis of information he had learned as its lawyer. The district court found a violation of Canon 4, disqualified
"Doe," and enjoined him from acting as counsel in any similar action or otherwise disclosing
any information he had gained during the course of his former employment.
" Id. at 1356.
"

No. 75-6488 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1978).
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pleadings and court papers;"6 the work product in question is more
likely to be the extensive preparatory work of the attorney prior to
disqualification. In cases of this sort, the denial of access to work
product is directly related to the purpose served by disqualification.
Although problems of characterizing the ethical breach and the extent of taint in the work product remain, a guiding principle is
established: work-product access should be granted except where
such access would compromise the protection sought to be afforded
by the disqualificaton order itself.
C.

The Problems of Characterization

If violations of the canons divided neatly into specific categories, the question of access to work product would be somewhat
simpler, although a significant problem would remain in identifying
any untainted work product produced in the course of a representation posing the problem of breaches of confidence. 7 Bright-line distinctions between violations would facilitate the process by allowing
the courts to categorize work product cases pursuant to a simple
rule: in the event of a Canon 4 violation, work product must be
suppressed; in the event of other violations, work product may pass
to substitute counsel. In the Doe case, a motion for access to work
product would be denied;"6 in the Levin case, it would be granted."
Unfortunately the distinctions are not always so clear-cut. Courts
are often faced with ethical violations for which the identification
of the applicable canon does not solve the question of work-product
access. In such cases, the courts must undertake a careful inquiry
into the nature of the conflicting representations, in order to deny
access to work product only if there is a significant prospect that
confidences or secrets might be revealed.
1. Fund of Funds. In Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. ArthurAndersen
& Co.,70 the Second Circuit faced an ethical problem arising from
"unusual facts 7 1 on the boundary of Canons 4 and 5. The New York
office of the law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius ("MLB"), a
longtime regional counsel to Arthur Andersen & Co., was engaged
by a Canadian liquidator as United States counsel in litigation arising from the fraud and mismanagement of the notorious Fund of
Id., slip op. at 2.
These problems are considered in Part I infra.
E'See text and notes at notes 63-64 supra.
" See text and notes at notes 35-42 supra.
70567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
11Id. at 226.
66
17
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Funds. It soon became apparent that the Fund might have a cause
of action against Arthur Andersen, which had served as auditor of
the Fund. MLB painstakingly avoided contact with the case against
Arthur Andersen by suing other defendants separately and by doing
a "disappearing act" 2 when discussions with other counsel turned
to the Arthur Andersen matter. Nevertheless, MLB selected or assisted in the selection of the firm of Milgrim, Thomajan & Jacobs,
with which it had worked on related matters, to handle the Fund's
suit against Arthur Andersen. MLB also passed along to the Fund's
Canadian solicitor any information concerning Arthur Andersen
that was "really hot," sent an associate to Milgrim, Thomajan to
review and revise the complaint against Arthur Andersen, and conducted certain studies and interviews jointly with Milgrim, Thomajan.713 The district court held that MLB would have been disqualified had the firm attempted to represent the Fund directly, but that
Milgrim, Thomajan need not be disqualified. It also denied Arthur
Andersen's motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice and to
74
suppress certain evidence as tainted by the involvement of MLB.
The Court of Appeals held that Milgrim, Thomajan was subject
to disqualification on both Canon 4 and Canon 5 grounds. 75 Under
Canon 5, the court viewed Milgrim, Thomajan's activity as aiding
and abetting MLB's breach of its duty of undivided loyalty to Arthur Andersen. Essentially, MLB attempted "to violate by indirection those very strictures it cannot directly contravene. ' 7 Under
Canon 4, the court reasoned that by virtue of the close relation
between the attorneys, Milgrim, Thomajan was "in a position to
'77
receive relevant confidences regarding Andersen.
The court, though mandating disqualification of Milgrim, Thomajan, affirmed the district court's denial of Arthur Andersen's
request for ancillary relief, which included suppression of the work
product collected by Milgrim, Thomajan and by MLB. 78 The court
purported to "strike a delicate balance between the Fund's interest
in representation by counsel of its choice and the need to maintain
high ethical standards within the profession of law. 71 9 The court's
72 Id. at 230.
73 Id. at 229, 231-32.
7, Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 435 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in

part, aff'd in part, 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
1s 567 F.2d at 233.
9, Id.

17 Id. at 235.
78 Id. at 236-37.
7' Id.
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determination thus apparently was based on a view of disqualification as a sanction rather than as a remedy to protect the aggrieved
former client.
In approving access to work product, the court relied on W. T.
Grant Co. v. Haines, 0 a case involving Disciplinary Rule 7-104,8I the
prohibition of direct contact between an attorney and the opposing
party. The W.T. Grant court had stated: "While disqualification is
clearly punitive insofar as Grant and its outside counsel are concerned, its benefit to Haines is indeed questionable. 8' 2 The precedent is quite inapposite in Fund of Funds, in which the court found
serious danger of prejudice to Arthur Andersen, which it sought to
remedy by disqualification. Moreover, the Fund of Funds court,
again citing W. T. Grant, described the proposed denial of access to
work product as affecting the outcome of the litigation-a result the
court was "loathe to countenance. ' 83 Yet it is precisely such tainted
work product as might affect the outcome that should be suppressed. The Fund of Funds case thus illustrates the danger of confusing the grounds for disqualification: its result may be questioned
as it was reached on the basis of an analysis of disqualification as a
sanction and of precedent involving no danger of prejudice to the
moving party.
2. First Wisconsin. The importance of alternative characterizations was even more strikingly illustrated by the decision in First
Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp." The case involved a dispute over extensive analyses of some 300 real estate loan
transactions prepared by fifteen lawyers associated with defendant's counsel, Foley & Lardner, over a period of more than a year.
Foley was disqualifed from the action on the basis of its former
representation of the plaintiff. 5 The district court denied substitute
counsel's motion for access to the Foley work product;8 6 a panel of
the Seventh Circuit affirmed; 87 finally, rehearing the case en banc,
the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court,88 with the author of
80531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976).

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSILrrY,
82 531 F.2d at 677.
SI

DR 7-104 (1975).

567 F.2d at 236; cf. Edilcentro Int'l, Ltd. v. Porco, No. 75-6488, slip op. at 11 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1978) (denial of access would not affect outcome).
584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 422 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
88 First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 74 F.R.D. 625 (E.D. Wis. 1977), rev'd,
584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
11 First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, vacated, 584 F.2d 201 (7th
Cir. 1978) (en banc).
" First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
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the panel opinion vigorously dissenting.89
Foley & Lardner had served as general counsel to the First
Wisconsin Corporation ("First Wisconsin") and its subsidiaries,
which included First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust ("Trust"). Among
its services to the Trust were the drafting of the "Advisory Agreement" governing the relation between the Trust and its advisor
(another subsidiary of First Wisconsin) and "Participation Agreements" governing the relationship between the Trust and First Wisconsin National Bank with regard to real estate loans. 0 When some
of the loans went sour, leading to negotiations between the Trust
and First Wisconsin regarding responsibility for the loss, Foley recommended that the Trust procure independent counsel, and the
parties continued to negotiate, with Foley representing First Wisconsin." In March, 1975, the Trust filed suit against First Wisconsin
and some of its subsidiaries, alleging violations of rule 10b-5. Two
days after the filing, Foley requested the Trust's consent to its continued representation of the defendants, stating in a letter to the
Trust that "with the consent of the Mortgage Trust and each of the
defendants, there is no ethical or other prohibition that precludes
us from representing the defendants in the action. 9' 2 The' Trust
declined to consent, requested that Foley withdraw, and in August
moved for disqualification. 3 After a delay of fifteen months,9 4 the
district court granted the motion for disqualification, which in turn
gave rise to a dispute over access to the work product Foley had
amassed.
Although disagreeing on many points of law, the majority and
dissent in First Wisconsin agreed that access to work product should
"turn on whether there exists a reasonable possibility of confidential
information being used in the formation of, or being passed to substitute counsel through the work product in question."" Disagreement hinged on the characterization of the Foley work product. The
majority opinion repeatedly asserted that the "routine lawyer work"
performed by Foley did not bear "the imprint of confidentially ac" Id. at 211 (Castle, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).

, 422 F. Supp. at 495.
*i 584 F.2d at 202.
,2 422 F. Supp. at 495.
584 F.2d at 203.
' Id. Apparently the unexplained delay in the disqualification decision was not responsible for the creation of the work product at issue. The loan file analyses were done in 1974
and early 1975, and completed before the motion for disqualification was made. Id.
" Id. at 209 (majority opinion) (quoting the dissent); id. at 217 (Castle, J., dissenting in
part, concurring in part).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[46:443

quired or secret information.""6 It based this conclusion on the ministerial nature of Foley's work and plaintiff's failure to claim that
the work product might reveal confidential information. The dissent claimed that there was "a possibility of confidential information being passed through or used to create the work product in this
case,"" reasoning that the work product
was generated by Foley & Lardner with an eye toward the
issues of the present suit and was based upon a relationship
with both plaintiff and defendants which gave Foley & Lardner
access to the innermost workings of plaintiff's organization and
the opportunity to observe first hand the discussion and decisions relevant to the issues in this case. 99
Both the majority and the dissent accused the other of advocating a per se rule. The majority claimed that the dissent's position
would result in automatic denial of access to work product whenever
an attorney was disqualified, regardless of whether there was a danger of prejudice arising from the possible use of confidential information.100 On the other hand, Judge Castle, dissenting, claimed that
the majority set the "near[ly] impossib[le]" requirement that the
movant point to a specific breach of confidence to justify a denial
of access. 01 His suggestion that the result reached by the majority
constituted a per se rule seems to have depended mainly on his
conclusion that the general counsel relationship that had existed
between Foley and the Trust presented the problem of confidentiality in its most egregious form. Allowing access in such a case, he
reasoned, would lead lower courts to be wary of denying access in
"the more common case, [in which] the disqualified law firm was
not generally counsel to both parties and involved in the very transactions at issue."' 0 2
The majority's position depended on its view of disqualification
as a sanction. Apparently convinced that the protective purpose of
" Id. at 210 (majority opinion).
,7Id. In addition, the majority argued that counsel for the Trust conceded in oral argument that the work product did not reveal any confidences. Id. As the dissent pointed out,
this concession was limited to the statement that the work product did not contain information subject to the attorney-client privilege in the technical evidentiary sense. Id. at 212
(Castle, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
98 584 F.2d at 223 (Castle, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
9'Id. at 217-18 (footnote omitted).
10Id. at 208-09 (majority opinion). Judge Pell, author of the en banc majority opinion,
had complained in his earlier panel opinion dissent that Judge Castle's approach "amounts
to a per se rule." 571 F.2d at 399 (Pell, J., dissenting).
101584 F.2d at 222 (Castle, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
10 Id.
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Canon 4 would not be served by denial of access to the work product
involved, the court did not even mention the canon, even though it
had apparently served as- the basis of the initial disqualification
order."0 3 The majority was able to conclude that denying access
"would in no way discipline disqualified counsel whose actions have
been the cause of the disqualification order," ' 4 implying that the
only purpose of the proceeding was disciplinary rather than protective. The majority opinion approvingly cited InternationalBusiness
Machines Corp. v. Levin for the proposition that "dig-qualification
in circumstances such as these where specific injury to the moving
party has not been shown is primarily justified as a vindication of
the integrity of the bar."10 5
Judge Castle's dissent emphasized that "the purpose of denying access to the work is not to penalize the defendants but, more
importantly, to protect the plaintiff specifically and the public generally."'' 0 Finding disqualification in this case to be grounded upon
Canon 4's protective policies, he could not so easily dismiss the
notion that denial of access to work product was required in order
to protect the Trust. He suggested that Foley could have used the
insights it gained through being present during the questioned
transactions to determine what facts in the loan files were important
and should be highlighted. 7 Whether or not this danger justifies
denial of access, 10 8 the dissent plainly exposes the failure of the
majority to articulate adequately the purpose for the disqualification of Foley and the relation of the work product to that purpose.
"1 The precise ground for the disqualification order is a matter of some confusion. The
district court applied the "substantial relation" test, see text at note 62 supra,thus implying
that Canon 4 was violated. The court, however, did not mention Canon 4, nor did it discuss
the possibility of breach of confidence. In its subsequent order denying access to the work
product, the district court did discuss the importance of protecting a client's confidences, 74
F.R.D. at 626, but relied more strongly on the importance of preserving "the confidence that
a client has in his attorney." Id. As the court's rhetorical question-"What greater violation
of confidence could there be than for that attorney in a subsequent court proceeding to
actively represent interests opposed to those of his former client?", id. at 627-shows, the
court's focus was upon the adverse representation rather than upon the breach of confidence.
The court concluded that "there is little or no point in the initial disqualification" without
denial of access to work product, id., thus implying that the denial was unrelated to any
concern for the protection of confidential information.
'
584 F.2d at 209 (majority opinion).
" Id. at 208 (quoting IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (2d Cir. 1978)). Judge Castle
rightly distinguished Levin. Id. at 216 n.6. See also lote 37 supra.
" Id. at 221 n.16 (Castle, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
Id. at 218.
,, See text and notes at notes 109-111 infra.
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PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDENS OF PROOF

When the purpose of disqualification is protection of the former client or current adversary, furtler intervention by the court
may be necessary to shield the former client from the possible prejudicial effect of substitute counsel's use of the disqualified attorney's
work product. Because of the cost to his opponent and the opportunity for litigious gamemanship, however, the remedy afforded must
be carefully limited to that legitimately required for the former
client's protection.
A.

The Presumption of Taint

Appellees in the First Wisconsin case urged," 9 and at least one
court has suggested, 110 that disqualification for breach of Canon 4,
or other violation of the confidential attorney-client relationship,
must necessarily be accompanied by a denial of access to work
product. Such an approach views work product as part of the wrongful representation, as an embodiment of the breach of confidence.
Under this view, it can be argued that the "substantial relation"
presumption applied in making the disqualification decision should
be extended to presume that the work product is tainted.
There are at least three reasons to reject this course. First,
although the possession of confidential information may be presumed from prior representation in a substantially related matter,
it does not follow that all work product-no matter how routine or
unrelated to the subject of the prior representation-is based upon
such confidences. Realistically, many items of work product present
little, if any, prospect of taint."' Second, if the court presumes that
all work product is tainted, it must suppress the pleadings, motions,
court papers, and discovery materials prepared or obtained by the
disqualified attorney, and the client must start afresh.12 Indeed,
- Brief for Appellee at 22, First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390,
vacated, 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
1,0 See Edilcentro Int'l, Ltd. v. Porco, No. 75-6488 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 12, 1978).
'
Even Judge Castle admitted that the possibility of confidences being used to the
disadvantage of the former client may be "miniscule" for some work product. 584 F.2d at 216
(Castle, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). See also id. n.8.
112 Some courts have argued that the work product of the disqualified attorney should
be distinguished from the primary documents the attorney collected through discovery or
from his client. Edilcentro Int'l, Ltd. v. Porco, No. 75-6488, slip op. at 11 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
12, 1978) (distinguishing Fund of Funds); First Wisconsin, 571 F.2d at 398 (panel opinion)
(distinguishing Allied Realty of St. Paul, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 408 F.2d 1099 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969), and E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371
(S.D. Tex. 1969)). This distinction does not withstand careful analysis. There is reason to
suspect that an attorney with inside information would be able to frame his discovery requests
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since the attorney may have divulged confidences to his current
client, it would logically be necessary to enjoin the client from
pursuing a cause of action-or defense possibly using tainted materials or information. Ordinarily, no court is likely to impose such a
drastic result on one party in order to protect the other.11 3 The trial
judge should instead be permitted to exercise discretion in tailoring
the order to the facts of each case, deciding which parts of the work
product to suppress and which to allow to pass to substitute counsel.
The third argument against applying a presumption of taint to
all work product of disqualified counsel is that such a presumption
involves an attenuated imputation of improper use of confidences
or secrets. The work product may have been created by the errant
attorney's associates, themselves not directly privy to the former
client's confidences. It is unreasonable to presume that their work
product has necessarily been shaped by the knowledge possessed by
their colleague.' 14 An anology might be drawn to disqualification
itself. Although the partners and associates of the challenged attorney may be disqualified from representing a party adverse to his
former client, the presumption is not generally extended a second
step. Thus, if a former associate of the errant attorney should join
a new firm, that firm is not prohibited from taking the suit."5 The
danger of the passage of confidential information from a vicariously
disqualified attorney is scant, in the event either of his joining a new
firm or of his preparing legal work.
Although the courts should not automatically suppress the entire work product of an attorney disqualified under Canon 4, neither
should they require the injured party to prove the existence of confidences or secrets in the work product as a predicate to their suppression. Judge Castle in First Wisconsin thought that the majority
and gather primary materials more precisely as a result of that information. Such an advan-

tage might be as significant as his ability to glean the pertinent facts from the documents
once collected. Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967). The work product passed on in Fund of Funds, Allied
Realty, and E.F. Hutton is therefore not significantly less prejudicial than that refused in

Edilcentro or the First Wisconsin panel opinion.
11 See W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The sins of counsel
should not be visited upon his client so as to vitiate the latter's cause of action."). Such a
result might be justified where the plaintiff would not know of his cause of action were it not

for the ethical breach. See Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per
curiam sub nom. Hall v. A. Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 ()d Cir. 1972).
" But see Edilcentro Int'l, Ltd. v. Porco, No. 75-6488, slip op, at 6, 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
12, 1978).
"I American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971); Liebman,
supra note 2, at 1000 & n.18.
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would require such a showing.' 6 As he pointed out, this approach is
both unworkable and unfair to the aggrieved party. Determining
which items of work product contain confidences would "require a
monumental commitment of judicial time. 1 1

7

1

Moreover, since

"[e]ven the most superficially innocuous document or statement
within a document""' may offer substitute counsel prejudicial insight, the court would be unable to protect adequately against the
prospect of such prejudice.
Judge Castle suggested that the court might engage in a caseby-case balancing test, weighing the possibility of prejudice to the
former client against the cost to the current client.1 9 Such a formulation, however, provides little practical guidance to the district
court facing the work-product-access decision. The two sides of the
balance are essentially incommensurable: a necessarily speculative
injury based on a possible breach of confidence must be balanced
against a more tangible monetary loss from the repetition of legal
work. Moreover, interest balancing is particularly difficult because
the more extensive is the work product, the greater is the prospect
of prejudice to the former client, and also the more onerous is the
burden of duplication. In this light the balancing test appears undesirable, providing neither predictable results nor reliable protection
to the parties. Finally, the balance is skewed. The decision to allow
access to work product is irreversible with respect to the former
client (in the absence of appellate relief), while under some circumstances, the current client may be able to recoup his losses by suing
his now disqualified attorney.'20
A better solution is to presume the disputed work product to
be tainted, but to allow the party seeking access to rebut this presumption in certain prescribed ways. The burden should be on the
party seeking access to prove that there is no substantial likelihood
of prejudice to the opposing party from the access, or that the opposing party's actions entitle him to access. If no such proof can be
made, access should be denied.' 2 '
"1 584 F.2d at 211-13 (Castle, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). Actually, the
majority required that the party opposing access point out to the court "the facets of the
relationship which it had had with the disqualified counsel which would somehow give an
improper advantage." Id. at 209 (majority opinion). This procedure is obviously quite different from "requiring that specific confidences be found." Id. at 221 (Castle, J., dissenting in
part, concurring in part).
1,7Id.

at 212.

,,8
Id. at 212-13.
, Id. at 220 n.15 (Castle, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
,' Id. at 219. See text and notes at notes 20-23 supra.
,21
See Liebman, supra note 2, at 1002 n.28. Liebman draws a distinction between two
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B. Rebutting the Presumption of Taint: The Circumstances of the
Creation of the Work Product
To rebut the presumption that the disqualified attorney's work
product is tainted, his current client, through substitute counsel,
should be allowed to offer proof that the challenged items of work
product were prepared under circumstances that show there was no
substantial likelihood that the work product reflected confidences
of the former client. This approach differs from that advocated by
the majority in First Wisconsin, 22 which placed the burden of proof
on the former client, rather than the current client, on the theory
that the former client is in "the best possible position to point out
to the district court the facets of the relationship" giving rise to
prejudice.1 2 Placing the burden on the current client is preferable
to the First Wisconsin approach because information concerning the
circumstances of the creation of the work product is almost solely
within the control of the current client or his disqualified attorney.
The nature and contents of the work product, the identity and position of the persons creating it, and the precautions taken to prevent
breaches of confidences all are known to the current client, but not
to the party opposing access. The former client's special knowledge-the confidences that he revealed' 24-is not pertinent to the
approaches to the evidentiary effect of the presumption. In the first, the fact is presumed only
so long as no evidence is submitted in rebuttal-the presumption shifts only the burden of
going forward. In the second approach, adopted here, the risk of nonpersuasion would still
remain with the party against whom the presumption operated initially-he must prove the
nonexistence of the presumed fact.
122584 F.2d at 209. But see Edilcentro Int'l, Ltd. v. Porco, No. 75-6488 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
30, 1977) (order for in camera inspection of work product). "Similarly, when examining
specific materials for confidential information, the former client seeking to preclude access
should enjoy an inference that confidential information is contained therein. Additionally,
where there is even a possibility that attorney-client confidences may be manifested within
the materials under consideration, access should be denied." Id., slip op. at 8. This approach
differs from the proposal in the text in two respects, however. First, it seems to presuppose a
need for inspection of the actual documents at this stage of the analysis. Second, it sets an
impossibly high standard for access, if the materials are to be suppressed no matter how small
the "possibility" that they may contain confidences.
123 584 F.2d at 209 (majority opinion). When necessary, the court said, the party would
be permitted to make in camera submissions concerning what confidences or secrets might
have been imparted. Id. The First Wisconsin approach also differs from the approach in the
text by focusing on the circumstances surrounding the exchange of confidences rather than
the creation of the work product.
124 In some circumstances, the client may be unaware of the confidences he has imparted
to the attorney, especially when the attorney was granted license to inspect any of the client's
records that the attorney might consider relevant. Even assuming a prodigious memory and
a full appreciation of the legal significance of apparently innocuous information, the assumption that the client's conscious disclosures are coextensive with the former attorney's knowledge seems dubious.
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question whether the work product is likely to reveal those confidences, whatever they may be. The issue will be determined by looking at the process of creating the legal work, not at the actual confidences imparted.
Evidence that might be introduced by a party seeking access
would include: an affidavit of documents by the disqualified firm ' 25
listing the documents available for access, affidavits or testimony
of the attorneys from the disqualified firm describing the production
of the work and access of the attorneys actually involved to confidential information or other secrets, and affidavits and testimony
regarding the procedures and practices of the firm. Application of
the suggested approach and use of this type of evidence might not
2
have changed the result in the First Wisconsin case, however.' 1
Substitute counsel for First Wisconsin could have made a persuasive argument that the loan file analyses in dispute were the product of ministerial work done by junior attorneys who had no access
to the confidences of the Trust. It would have been difficult to refute
this argument, especially since the Trust's counsel came close to
admitting that confidential information was not involved in the
dispute.127 Even after placing the burden on First Wisconsin rather
than the Trust, the court might therefore have been justified in
concluding that there was no substantial possibility of the revelation of confidences through access to the Foley work product.
There are certain recurring factual situations in which denial
of access is inappropriate: work performed by persons to whom the
knowledge of the firm may not realistically be attributed, work performed by persons isolated from exposure to confidences, and rou, An analogy to the British procedure for handling claims of privilege in discovery may
prove instructive. The party seeking discovery serves an.interrogatory that is met by an
affidavit of all relevant documents from the other party. Objections to particular documents
may result in a limited inspection of the material by the court. 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
26.63[2-1], at 26-349 to 26-350 (2d ed. 1976). In a case involving access to the work product
of a disqualified attorney, a similar process might be followed: substitute counsel would
request a list of documents, indicating the particular materials sought; the party seeking
to prevent access might then object to furnishing documents that he considers likely to be
tainted.
"I Substitute counsel for First Wisconsin relied principally upon the assumption that the
nonconfidentiality of the work product was undisputed. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at
29, First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, vacated, 584 F.2d 201 (7th
Cir. 1978) (en banc). Substitute counsel did not discuss the possibility that Foley's inside
information assisted in the analysis; nor did counsel for the Trust raise this possibility. The
Trust relied principally on the argument that disqualification necessarily entails denial of
access to work product. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 15, 17, First Wis. Mortgage Trust v.
First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, vacated, 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
'

See note 97 supra.
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tine or nonfactual legal work. The difficult task for a court is to
recognize these situations in which denial of access is not required
to serve the purposes of disqualification.
1. Work Performed by Persons To Whom the Knowlege of the
Firm May Not Realistically Be Attributed. In Edilcentro International, Ltd. v. Porco,28 the disqualified firm had formerly been
general counsel to a corporation that was joined after discovery as
a codefendant in the suit.' The work product in dispute was of two
types: legal memoranda written by a summer law clerk and a first
year associate, and the work papers of an accounting firm hired by
the law firm. In its first work-product order, 30 the district court
rejected "the proposition that disqualification of [the law firm]
herein necessarily requires a denial of access to the requested materials, 1 '

31 and

ordered the work product to be submitted to the court

for in camera inspection. In its next order, 3 2 issued a year later, the
court decided that in camera inspection was improper 33 and denied
access to the entire work product. With respect to the legal memoranda, the court stood by its decision notwithstanding its assumption that "these memoranda were prepared by people who were
working in a factual vacuum;' ' 34 with respect to the accounting

work papers, the court denied access because they were based on
documents selected by the law firm and on information given to the
accountants by the firm.'3
The Edilcentro order was needlessly harsh. To deny access to
the legal memoranda without regard for whether they were prepared
in a "factual vacuum" is to suppress the work whether or not it
might reveal confidences. The court's suggestion that the legal issues treated in the memoranda were framed by a member of the
36
firm who presumably had access to the confidential information
is unpersuasive; the analysis in the memoranda was routine37 and in
no way created for the special circumstances of the case.1
No. 75-6488 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1978) (order denying access to work product).
I" See Edilcentro Int'l Ltd. v. Porco, No. 75-6488, slip op. at 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 30, 1976)
12

(disqualification order).
I" Edilcentro Int'l Ltd. v. Porco, No. 75-6488 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1977) (order for in
camera inspection of work product).
"I Id., slip op. at 9.
12 Edilcentro Int'l Ltd. v. Porco, No. 75-6488 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1978) (order denying access to work product).

Id., slip op. at 3-5.

'1

,3' Id. at 6.
"3

Id. at 8-9.

Id. at 10 n.5.
The memoranda concerned case law on brokers' duties and liabilities, the law on
imputation of knowledge in agency, and common-law and statutory liability of aiders and
'

"
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Treating summer clerks and young associates differently from
partners or associates who are closely involved with a client has
substantial support in the case law of disqualification. Although
such junior lawyers are subject to the Code of Professional Responsibility, including disqualification and vicarious disqualification,'38
courts have often recognized the practical reality of the status of the
young lawyer, and have distinguished "lawyers who become heavily
involved in the facts of a particular matter [from] those who enter
briefly on the periphery for a limited and specific purpose relating
solely to legal questions."' 39 This distinction cuts with still greater
force on the question of access to the junior attorney's work product.
Realistically, the junior attorney is not privy to confidential information not necessary to his narrow task; there is, therefore, little
reason to suppress his work product unless it was directly based on
confidential materials.
2. Work Performed by Persons Isolated from Exposure to
Confidences. Within some large law firms-especially multi-city
firms-it may be unlikely that the confidences of a client are shared
by all the members of the firm representing clients with potentially
conflicting interests. Some firms attempt to construct a "Chinese
Wall" to insulate certain members of the firm from contact with
others. Such an arrangment may not be sufficient protection for a
former client so as to make disqualification unnecessary; the danger
always exists that the "Wall" will be breached. 40 With regard to
abettors. Id. at 5. Similarly, the accountant's papers were prepared under general instructions
to trace the flow of funds through the defendant corporations in order to locate the sum of
money that was the source of the dispute. Id. at 7. None of the lawyers who communicated
with the accountants had any connection with the prior representation. A different result
might be mandated if there were any evidence that attorneys who had formerly represented
the defendant had imparted any information to guide the accountants to particular portions
of defendant's records.
"' Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir.
1975); Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920,
927 (2d Cir. 1954). See also NCK Organization v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1976).
I, Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756 (2d Cir.
1975). See also Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1323-24 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Laskey Bros., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d
824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 982 (1956); Liebman, supra note 2, at 1002-04.
"' See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978). See also Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d
1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976). But see Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc.,
573 F.2d 988, 991-93 (8th Cir. 1978) (approving an arrangement screening the "tainted"
attorney in a Canon 9 case). For a discussion of Chinese Walls and "revolving doors," see
Liebman, supra note 2, at 1011 n.57 (examining the controversy surrounding the impact of
Canon 9's restrictions on former government attorneys returning to private practice in Washington, D.C.).
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work product, however, the court need only determine whether the
"Wall" has in fact remained intact, a task that is far less difficult
than predicting its future efficacy.
One example of the difficulties of the "Chinese Wall" approach
is the recent disqualification of the Chicago law firm of Kirkland &
Ellis in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.",'Kirkland's Washington, D.C., office represented the American Petroleum Institute ("API") in connection with congressional hearings on
the oil industry. One of the issues in the hearings was the competitive effect of the ownership by oil companies of uranium production
facilities. During the course of the representation, Kirkland's Washington office obtained extensive data from API members under a
strict pledge of confidentiality. The Chicago office during this time
was preparing a suit on behalf of Westinghouse against 29 uranium
producers, including three API members who had supplied the
Washington office with data. On the day the Washington office
released the API report which described the healthy competitive
atmosphere in the uranium industry, Kirkland's Chicago office filed
suit on behalf of Westinghouse, alleging that the uranium producers
42
had conspired to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act.1
Evidence showed that the Washington office was unaware of the
Westinghouse suit until it was filed and that the Chicago office
knew nothing of the substance of the API representation."' Kirkland
claimed that it had constructed a "Chinese Wall" separating the
attorneys working on the two matters.'
The work-product issue has not yet reached the court in
Westinghouse, but substitute counsel has announced its intention
to attempt to obtain access to documents prepared by Kirkland's
Chicago office. 4 5 The court will thus have the opportunity to decide
what effect a "Chinese Wall" arrangement should have on the access question. The appellate court did not have to analyze the effect
of Kirkland's "Chinese Wall" very closely to decide the disqualification issue; even if there were no threat to confidences under Canon
4, there was a simultaneous adverse representation, prohibited by
Canon 5.141 To decide the access question, however, the court must
14 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
14

Id. at 1312-16. The facts are set out in more detail in the district court's opinion, 448

F. Supp. 1284, 1287-1300 (N.D. fl1. 1978).
"
580 F.2d at 1321.
'

Id. Evidence established only one breach of this wall; one Chicago-based attorney

involved in the Westinghouse matter agreed to prepare on behalf of API a memorandum
analyzing arguments for extending the antitrust laws to prohibit interlocking directorates.
Nat'l L.J., Nov. 20, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
'
Kirkland argued, and the district court agreed, that there was no breach of Canon 5
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examine Kirkland's procedures closely to see if there was any realistic possibility that the confidences of the API members were used
in the Westinghouse matter. The facts of the case suggest there was
no such possibility. The physical separation of the two offices decreases the likelihood of casual contact; the one overlap in the representations that did occur had nothing to do with uranium."' Moreover, both the API matter-because of agreement-and the Westinghouse antitrust suit-because of securities laws-were kept confidential even within the firm.' These circumstances bolster the
testimony by affidavit of the attorneys in the Westinghouse suit
that they did not communicate with the Washington office on the
matter and did not have access to the confidential materials. 49
3. Routine or Nonfactual Legal Work. Some of the most troublesome work-product cases are likely to concern work done by disqualified counsel on purely legal or procedural questions, or in compiling, analyzing, and indexing documents. It may generally be said
that such work is unlikely to be tainted; 151 in some cases, however,
seemingly routine or nonfactual work will be highly influenced by
the possession of inside information. 151 A general rule thus will not
suffice. The trial court must make its decision based on a close and
detailed analysis of the ethical breach and the nature of the work
product.
In the First Wisconsin case, for example, the court should have
determined what previous contact Foley lawyers had with the loans
in question. Apparently, Foley lawyers attended and took minutes
of meetings at which the loan agreements were formally discussed
because there was no attorney-client relation between Kirkland and the individual members
of API. 448 F. Supp. at 1300-03. The court of appeals rejected this narrow construction of
the elements necessary to give rise to the fiduciary relation. 580 F.2d at 1318-20.
147See note 144 supra.
448 F. Supp. at 1293, 1296.
"' See id. at 1296.

14

'5 Legal work done on substantive areas not related to the prior representation should
almost always be untainted. Similarly innocuous is work performed before the cause for
disqualification arose-for example, before the arrival of an attorney whose presence requires
the disqualification of the entire firm. See First Wisconsin, 584 F.2d at 216 (Castle, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part).
151For example, the initial pleadings are usually unobjectionable. In some cases, however, illicit information may have been used to uncover the cause of action. In such cases,
the pleadings must be stricken. Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per
curiam sub nom. Hall v. A. Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972); Slater v. Rimar, Inc., 462
Pa. 138, 338 A.2d 584 (1975).
Judge Castle has reasoned that papers filed with the court tend to be less prejudicial than
other work product, because the other party has the opportunity to inspect them and to detect
any confidential information disclosed. 584 F.2d at 216 n.8 (Castle, J., dissenting in part,
concurring in part).
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and approved. In a few instances the firm did substantive analysis
of the loans.' 52 With the exception of the latter, the court might be
justified in concluding that witnessing the mere formal presentation
and approval of the agreements gave Foley no unfair advantage in
the subsequent suit. The files pertaining to the loans Foley had
previously analyzed could be pulled and the remainder turned over
to substitute counsel.
Once the party seeking access has convinced the court that the
work done by disqualified counsel was routine and that there is no
realistic likelihood that the work reflects confidential information,
the burden shifts to the party opposing access. That party should
have the opportunity to prove that portions of the work product are
tainted, where appropriate by in camera inspection of the work
product by the court.
The propriety of in camera proceedings for the purpose of evaluating disqualification motions has been much debated by the
courts;"13 few courts have employed them." 4 Although the propriety
of such proceedings has arisen less frequently in work-product cases,
the courts are split.' 5 The hesitancy to use in camera inspection of
documents is understandable. It is a cumbersome and timeconsuming process for the court;" 6 it is an inadequate protection for
the former client, since he should not have to bring potentially
embarrassing information to the attention of the court in order to
112 422

F. Supp. 493, 498 (E.D. Wis. 1976), reu'd, 584 F.2d 201, 202 (7th Cir. 1978) (en

banc).
10 Compare Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1978)
(Mansfield, J., concurring) and Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954) with Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478
F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973) and Richardson v. Hamilton nt'l Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1049, 1051
(E.D. Pa. 1971), affl'd, 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973). In the
most recent appellate court decision, in camera proceedings were rejected on the grounds that
this "would require the disclosure of the very matters intended to be protected by the rule."
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978) (quoting
T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)).
-SISee, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); cf. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1104 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (in camera inspections in a trade secrets case).
,, Compare First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 209 (7th Cir.
1978) (en banc) (endorsing use of in camera proceedings to evaluate motions for access to work
product) with Edilcentro Int'l Ltd. v. Porco, No. 75-6488, slip op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12,
1978) (order denying access, concluding that in camera inspection is inappropriate).
"I See First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d at 212 (Castle, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). In a case such as Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 353 (1978), in which more than one
million pages of documents have been put at risk by the disqualification of plaintiff's counsel,
such a process seems unduly cumbersome. See Nat'l L.J., Nov. 20, 1978, at 11, col. 1.
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obtain its protection;15 7 and it is an ineffective means of identifying
tainted work product. 5' 8 Nevertheless, in some cases in camera
inspection may be useful. Both the burden of the inspection and the
undesirable exposure of the court to information embarrassing to
the former client may be alleviated by appointing a special master
to examine the work product."9 The procedure will admittedly remain an ineffective means of spotting tainted work product, but this
ineffectiveness is not a great concern, since it will already have been
established that there is no reasonable likelihood that the work
product reflects confidential information. For the limited purpose of
providing the opponent of access one last opportunity to prove that
the work product is tainted, in camera inspection seems unobjectionable.
C. Rebutting the Presumption of Taint: The Timeliness of the
Disqualification Motion
Many reported disqualification cases concern motions for disqualification that were made long after the moving party learned of
the grounds for disqualification, 6 ' giving rise to some suspicion of
the movant's good faith.'' Such delay might be explicable upon two
grounds: either the ethical infraction initially appeared unimportant or the moving party sought tactical advantage by delay. Delay
tends to encourage the challenged attorney to generate work product
for his client. Sometimes this encouragement is more direct, as
where the party files interrogatories for opposing counsel to answer.
The court should not reward such gamesmanship, nor should it give
157 Note, Disqualificationof Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former
Clients, 64 YA.LE L.J. 917, 926 (1955).
I's 584 F.2d at 212-13 (Castle, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). Only when
particular secrets are transcribed in the work-product documents will the court be able to
identify them. In the more common situation, where the illicit information is used to guide
or focus th6 work product's creation, the court will be unable to detect anything amiss. But
see Note, supra note 56, at 1071 ("The court. . . can remove any uncertainty about work
product by inspecting in camera the documents sought by substitute counsel.") (footnotes
omitted).
"I Cf. Fisher Studio, Inc. v. Loews, Inc., 232 F.2d 199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
836 (1956) (special master appointed to investigate the asserted grounds for disqualification).
Costs might be assigned to the party losing on the motion.
160E.g., First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 203 (7th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (delay during course of adversary negotiations); Koehring Co. v. Manitowac Co.,
418 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (same); Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622, 632 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (nineteen year delay).
M Judge Castle suggested that when the timing of the motion for disqualification indicated an intent to harass the other party, such lack of good faith might be given weight in
the access decision. 584 F.2d at 216 n.8 (Castle, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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more protection to the moving party than is warranted by the
party's concern with his own protection.
Although in some cases, delay in moving for disqualification
62
should result in a denial of the disqualification motion itself,
where the interest of the public in maintaining the integrity of the
judicial process is paramount, a party's delay should not preclude
disqualification. 3 But denial of access to work product does not
substantially promote the public purposes of disqualification. Such
denial serves only to protect the former client from the potential use
of prejudicial information imparted to a lawyer in confidence.'6 4
Consequently, there is no public policy bar to permitting parties to
waive, by a delayed motion,6 5 their rights to protest access to work
product. Sound policy reasons support such a timeliness requirement. Not only would it decrease the opportunity for litigious
gamesmanship, and thereby promote the goal of judicial fairness
and economy, it would also decrease the wasteful process of the
creation of work product that ultimately must be suppressed. A
party seeking access should therefore be able to invoke a timeliness
requirement as an independent ground for rebutting the presumption that work product is tainted. A party should be deemed to have
waived his right to object to the passing on of work product created
after he knew or should have known 6' of the grounds for disqualifi142 Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 992 (8th Cir.
1978) (party may not delay disqualification motion "in order to use the motion later as a tool
to deprive his opponent of counsel of his choice after substantial preparation of a case has
been completed"). See also Lau v. Valu-Bilt Homes, Inc., 582 P.2d 195, 202-03 (Hawaii 1978);
Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So. 2d 401, 409 (La. App.) (dictum), writ refused, 253 La. 60, 216
So. 2d 307 (1968); Gottwals v. Rencher, 60 Nev. 35, 48, 98 P.2d 481, 487 (1940).
"I One commentator has observed: "It must be remembered that an attorney is a servant
of the state-an officer of the court-as well as a representative of his client. The client cannot
waive the rights of the state." Kaplan, ForbiddenRetainers, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 914, 925 (1956)
(footnote omitted). See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 574 (2d Cir. 1973);
Koehring Co. v. Manitowoc Co., 418 F. Supp. 1133, 1138-39 (E.D. Wis. 1976); American
Dredging Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 389 A.2d 568, 571 (Pa. 1978); Earl Scheib, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 253 Cal. App. 2d 703, 61 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1967); cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 228-29 (7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting an argument of waiver in a
Canon 4 case on the basis that "it is impossible to conclude that a client could ever have
any reason to desire that information disclosed in confidence should be utilized against
him"); Empire Linotype School, Inc. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 627, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(court can disqualify counsel on its own motion).
" See text and notes at notes 62-66 supra.
"3 Nor is there a public policy bar to settlements of disputes over work product, such as
that proposed in First Wisconsin. The Trust proposed that First Wisconsin be permitted
access on the condition that the Trust receive access to the Foley work product as well. 584
F.2d at 211 n.5 (en banc majority opinion); 571 F.2d at 401 n.* (panel opinion, Pell, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part).
I" The Code of Professional Responsibility is self-enforcing by design; it requires an
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cation and before his filing of either a motion for disqualification or
a formal
request to the former attorney to withdraw from the mat7
ter.16
CONCLUSION

The client of a disqualified attorney faces considerable additional litigation costs: delay of his action, loss of the counsel of his
choice, and the cost of substituting new counsel. His loss may be
greatly magnified if his substitute counsel is denied access to the
preparatory work done by the disqualified attorney. The prospect of
inflicting so great a loss upon the opponent may tempt the other
party to pursue disqualification and denial of access to work product
in situations where regard for professional ethics and protection of
the client's interests do not strictly demand it. Consequently, courts
should take care to exercise their power to suppress the work product of disqualified counsel only where such suppression is required
to accomplish the purposes of the disqualification itself.
This comment has suggested a method for deciding when access
to work product should be granted to substitute counsel and when
it should be denied. When the former client of an attorney obtains
the attorney's disqualification in order to protect his confidences or
secrets, a presumption arises that the attorney's work product is
tainted as well. Substitute counsel may rebut this presumption, by
proving either that there was no realistic possibility that the confidences were reflected in the work product, or that the motion for
disqualification was untimely. Such an approach would achieve a
reasonable accomodation of the valid interests of the former client,
the client who faces the burdens imposed by disqualification of
counsel, and a judicial system already beset by protracted litigation
resulting from tactical delay.
John P. Gyorgy
attorney to decline or withdraw from employment when representation is improper. See, e.g.,
OF PROFESSIONAL RZsPoNssnxrY, EC 4-5 (1975). The burden should not be placed
on the opposing party to discover his opponent's breach. The requirement that waiver occur
when the party "should have known" of the ethical breach is purely evidentiary; any doubts
should be resolved against the offending attorney.
11 Since the grounds for disqualification will often be known before a suit is filed, and
thus before a motion for disqualification can be made, a formal request to the attorney to
withdraw would accomplish the same purpose as a motion. This would avoid a situation such
as that in First Wisconsin, in which Foley & Lardner represented First Wisconsin in adversary
negotiations for over a year without objection from the Trust, although the Trust was fully
cognizant of the fact that Foley had been its general counsel. 584 F.2d at 202-03.

ABA CODE

